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Social advertising (or social promotion) is an effective approach that produces a significant cascade of
adoption through influence in the online social networks. The goal of this work is to optimize the ad allocation
from the platform’s perspective. On the one hand, the platform would like to maximize revenue earned from
each advertiser by exposing their ads to as many people as possible, one the other hand, the platform wants
to reduce free-riding to ensure the truthfulness of the advertiser. To access this tradeoff, we adopt the concept
of regret (Aslay et al. 2015) to measure the performance of an ad allocation scheme. In particular, we study
two social advertising problems: budgeted social advertising problem and unconstrained social advertising
problem. In the first problem, we aim at selecting a set of seeds for each advertiser that minimizes the regret
while setting budget constraints on the attention cost; in the second problem, we propose to optimize a
linear combination of the regret and attention costs. We prove that both problems are NP-hard, and then
develop a constant factor approximation algorithm for each problem.
“When we boost posts, we see twice as much engagement, twice as much website traffic
and often double our sales.” – Jaron Schneider, Features Editor, Fstoppers
1. Introduction
Social advertising (or social promotion) is an effective approach that produces a significant
cascade of adoption through influence in the online social networks. During a typical social
advertising campaign, advertisers attempt to persuade influential consumers to promote
their products or services among his friends. With more people using social networking
services, recent days have witnessed a boom of social networking sites that offer social
advertising (SA) services. To name a few, the primary SA mechanisms adopted by Facebook
are Facebook Ads, Promoted Posts and Boost Posts; Twitter allows businesses to promote
their accounts and Tweets as well as promote “trends”; LinkedIn users can create an
advert, sponsor content or use Sponsored InMail to launch an email marketing campaign.
Take Facebook as an example, boosting posts is considered as an effective way to get more
exposure for one’s posts, offers or special events. It allows businesses to pay for posts to
be more predominantly displayed on news feeds. Facebook users will see promoted posts
labeled with “Sponsored” in the news feed (not in the right rail where Facebook ads live)
both on desktop and mobile. Promoted posts have the same targeting ability that organic
posts do, thus they can propagate across the network through “reposts” or “shares”. Recent
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field studies (Bakshy et al. 2012)(Tucker 2012) find that social advertising is more effective
than conventional demographically targeted or untargeted ads.
The goal of this work is to optimize the ad allocation from the platform’s perspec-
tive. We consider the cost per engagement (CPE) model, the advertiser buy a block of
“engagements” such as impressions or clicks from the platform owner via contracts, and
the advertiser pays the platform an amount αi per engagement that is delivered from its ad
ai. Each advertiser also sets his budget Bi that specifies the maximum amount of money
he would like to pay. It was worth noting that this budget is fixed regardless of the actual
amount of engagements that are received at the end of the campaign. Therefore, due to the
uncertainty of virality, it is possible that an advertiser may receive more engagements than
would be expected under his budget. Unfortunately, this uncertainty may utterly destroy
the truthfulness of the advertiser, i.e., the advertiser tends to declare lower budget, hoping
to obtain more engagements. Then it is interesting to observe that, on the one hand, the
platform would like to maximize revenue earned from each advertiser by exposing their ads
to as many people as possible, one the other hand, the platform wants to reduce free-riding
to ensure the truthfulness of the advertiser. To access this tradeoff, we adopt the concept
of regret (Aslay et al. 2015) to measure the performance of an ad allocation scheme.
In addition, as the promoted posts are displayed along with organic posts, it is possible
to impede the user experience by pushing too many promoted posts to one user. One way
to mitigate this is to set a limit, called attention constraint, on the maximum number of
promoted posts that can be pushed to each individual user as well as the whole community.
Our Results: In this paper, we propose and study two social advertising problems:
budgeted social advertising problem and unconstrained social advertising problem. In the
first problem, we aim at selecting a set of seeds for each advertiser that minimizes the
regret while setting budget constraints on the attention cost; in the second problem, we
propose to optimize a linear combination of the regret and attention costs. We first prove
that both problems are NP-hard by reducing them from traditional influence maximization
problem. Then we develop two constant factor approximation algorithms for each problem.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Matroid
A matroidM = (Ω,I) is defined on a finite ground set Ω, and I is a family of subsets of Ω
which are called independent sets. For M to be a matroid, I must satisfy two properties:
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• (I1) if X ⊆ Y and Y ∋ I then X ∈ I,
• (I2) if X ∈ I and Y ∈ I and |Y |> |X | then ∃e∈ Y \X :X ∪{e} ∈ I.
Property (I1) says that every subset of an independent set is independent. Property (I2),
which is also called independent set exchange property, says that ifX and Y are independent
sets, and Y has more elements than X , there exists an element in Y \X that by adding
that element to X gives larger independent set. According to Property (I2), one can verify
that all maximal independent sets have the same cardinality. A maximal independent set
is called a base of the matroid.
2.2. Submodular function
Consider an arbitrary function f(S) that maps subsets of a finite ground set Ω to non-
negative real numbers. We say that f is submodular if it satisfies a natural “diminishing
returns” property: the marginal gain from adding an element to a set S is at least as
high as the marginal gain from adding the same element to a superset of S. Formally, a
submodular function satisfies the follow property: For every X,Y ⊆ Ω with X ⊆ Y and
every x∈Ω\Y , we have that
f(X ∪{x})− f(X)≥ f(Y ∪{x})− f(Y )
We say a submodular function f is monotone if f(X)≤ f(Y ) whenever X ⊆ Y .
2.3. Propagation Model
To capture the dynamics of ads propagation in social networks, one of the most widely used
model, called Independent Cascade Model, is investigated recently in the context of mar-
keting (Goldenberg et al. 2001a)(Goldenberg et al. 2001b)(Kempe et al. 2003). To account
for the heterogeneity of ads propagation under different ads, we adopted an extended prop-
agation model, called topic-aware propagation model (TIC). Let Gi = (V, pi(E)) denote
the diffusion graph under ad (or topic) ai, where V represent the set of all users in the net-
work, pi(u, v) represents the diffusion probability between u and v for ad ai. TIC describes
a spreading process comprising of seed nodes and non-seed nodes. The process unfolds in
discrete timesteps. In each timestep, when a user u clicks an ad ai, it has one chance of
influencing each inactive neighbor v with success probability pi(u, v). More formally, the
input to the independent cascade model is an initial set of seed nodes Si ⊆V for each ad
ai. Let σi(Si) denote the expected number of clicks (or engagements) received from ad ai
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under seed set Si. Let αi denote the cost per-engagement for ad ai, the expected revenue
received from ai is αi ·σi(Si). As proved in (Kempe et al. 2003), αi ·σi(Si) is a submodular
and monotone function.
3. Problem Statement
Given a hyper social graph G = (G1,G2, · · · ,G|A|), where each graph Gi represents the
diffusion network under topic or ad ai. Assume there are K advertisers that participate
in the campaign, denoted by A= {a1, a2, · · · , a|A|}, each advertiser ai has a finite budget
Bi. The host needs to identify and allocate a set of users to each of the advertisers. On
the one hand, the platform would like to maximize revenue earned from each advertiser by
exposing their ads to as many people as possible, one the other hand, the platform wants
to reduce free-riding to ensure the truthfulness of the advertiser. To access this tradeoff, we
introduce the concept of regret to measure the performance of an ads allocation scheme.
The regret under seed set S = {S1, S2, · · · , S|A|} is defined as
∑
ai∈A
|αi · σi(Si)−Bi|. To
minimize the regret is equivalent to maximizing the following utility function:
U(S) =
∑
ai∈A
Ui(S)
where
Ui(S) =
αi · σi(Si) if αi · σi(Si)≤Bi2 ·Bi−αi · σi(Si) if αi · σi(Si)>Bi (1)
Any ad allocation can be represented using a |V|× |A| matrix X, called allocation matrix,
where
Xij =
1 if user vi is assigned to ad aj0 otherwise
Then the individual attention cost on user vi is
∑|A|
j=1Xij and the overall attention cost is∑|V|
i=1
∑|A|
j=1Xij. In the rest of this paper, we use S and X interchangeably to represent an
ad allocation.
Selection of good seeds with high utility and small attention cost is a critical decision
faced by every platform. In this paper, we propose and study two problems that allow
to combine the two objectives: Budgeted Social Advertising problem and Unconstrained
Social Advertising problem. In the first problem, we aim at selecting a set of seeds for each
advertiser that maximizes the utility while setting budget constraints on the attention cost;
in the second problem, we propose to maximize a linear combination of the two measures.
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3.1. Budgeted Social Advertising Problem
In the budgeted social advertising problem, we set hard constraints on individual attention
cost and overall attention cost: let κi denote the individual attention limit of user vi and K
denote the overall attention limit, then ∀vi ∈ V :
∑|A|
j=1Xij ≤ κi and
∑|V|
i=1
∑|A|
j=1Xij ≤K.
P.1: Maximize U(S)
subject to:
∀vi ∈ V :
∑|A|
j=1
Xij ≤ κi (C1: individual attention constraint)∑|V|
i=1
∑|A|
j=1
Xij ≤K (C2: overall attention constraint)
∀vi ∈ V , aj ∈A :Xij ∈ {0,1}
Theorem 1. The budgeted social advertising problem is NP-hard.
Proof: We will reduce our problem from the traditional influence maximization problem.
Let κi =∞ for each vi, then the only constraint is the overall attention constraint K.
Assume there is only one ad, i.e., |A|=1, our problem under this setting is equivalent
traditional influence maximization problem (Kempe et al. 2003), i.e., finding a set of seeds
that maximize the utility function U(S) subject to cardinality constraint K. 
3.2. Unconstrained Social Advertising Problem
Given a seeds selection S, we first define the cost function C(S).
C(S) = λ1 ·
|V|∑
i=1
exp(max{0,
|A|∑
j=1
Xij −κi})︸ ︷︷ ︸
PartI
+λ2 · exp(max{0,
|V|∑
i=1
|A|∑
j=1
Xij −K})︸ ︷︷ ︸
PartII
where Part I (resp. Part II) is the penalty resulting from exceeding the individual attention
budget (resp. the overall attention budget), λ1 (resp. λ2) is a parameter that determines
how strictly we would like to penalize for exceeding the individual budget (resp. the overall
budget). Then the objective function is defined as U(S)−C(S).
P.2: Maximize U(S)−C(S)
Theorem 2. The unconstrained social advertising problem is NP-hard.
Proof: Similar to the proof of Theorem 1, we still reduce our problem from traditional influ-
ence maximization problem. Consider the following problem setting: assume there is only
one advertiser, and λ1 = 0, λ2 =∞. Then one necessary condition to ensure the optimality
for any given solution is to strictly obey the overall attention budget K. This problem
is equivalent to the traditional influence maximization problem (Kempe et al. 2003), i.e.,
finding a set of seeds that maximize the utility function U(S) subject to cardinality con-
straint K. 
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4. Budgeted Social Advertising Problem
We instead turn to an alternative approach by first introducing a new utility function
V (S). Let
V (S) =
∑
ai∈A
Vi(S)
where
Vi(S) =min{αi · σi(Si),Bi}
Recall that Bi is the maximum amount advertiser ai is willing to pay regardless of the
seed selection, thus Vi(S) can be interpreted as the actual payoff from ai under seed set S.
Now, we are ready to introduce the following revenue maximization problem (RMP):
RMP: Maximize V (S)
subject to:{
∀vi ∈ V :
∑|A|
j=1
Xij ≤ κi (C1: individual attention constraint)∑|V|
i=1
∑|A|
j=1
Xij ≤K (C2: overall attention constraint)
In order to find a solution for P.1, we first work with RMP and develop an algorithm
with provable performance bound. Later, we slightly modify this solution, and obtain an
approximation algorithm for P.1.
Let ŜP.1 = {ŜP.11 , Ŝ
P.1
2 , · · · , Ŝ
P.1
|A| } (resp. Ŝ
R = {ŜR1 , Ŝ
R
2 , · · · , Ŝ
R
|A|}) denote the optimal solu-
tion of problem P.1 (resp. RMP), i.e.,
ŜP.1 = argmaxSU(S), Ŝ
R = argmaxSV (S)
subject to constraints C1 and C2. In the following lemma, we first establish a relation
between P.1 and RMP.
Lemma 1.
V (ŜR)≥U(ŜP.1)
Proof: We prove this lemma through contradiction. First of all, since both S∗
P.1
and S∗RMP
must satisfy constraints C1 and C2, thus ŜP.1 and ŜR are feasible solutions to both P.1
and RMP. Assume by contradiction that V (ŜR)<U(ŜP.1), then for each ŜP.1i ∈ Ŝ
P.1, either
one of the following holds: (1) αi ·σi(ŜP.1i )≤Bi, or (2) αi ·σi(Ŝ
P.1
i )>Bi. According to the
definition of U(S) and V (S):
1. If (1) holds, Ui(ŜP.1) = αi · σi(ŜP.1i ) and Vi(Ŝ
P.1) = αi · σi(ŜP.1i );
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2. Otherwise, if (2) holds, Ui(ŜP.1) = 2 ·Bi−αi · σi(ŜP.1i ) and Vi(Ŝ
P.1) =Bi.
In either case, we have
Vi(ŜP.1)≥Ui(ŜP.1)
Then we have
V (ŜP.1) =
|A|∑
i=1
Vi(ŜP.1)≥
|A|∑
i=1
Vi(ŜP.1)≥U(ŜP.1)
Together with the assumption that V (ŜR)<U(ŜP.1), we have
V (ŜP.1)>V (ŜR)
This contradicts to the assumption that ŜR is an optimal solution of RMP. 
Algorithm 1 Greedy-RMP (subroutine)
Input: Social network G, budget B, individual attention constraint κi, overall attention constraint K.
Output: Seed set S.
1: for Si ∈ S do
2: Si = ∅
3: repeat
4: without violating constraints C1∼C2, add vi to Sj that gives the highest marginal value in V (S).
5: until no more seeds can be added without violating constraints C1∼C2, or V (S) has reached
∑|A|
i=1
Bi.
6: return S.
Algorithm 2 Greedy-P.1
Input: Social network G, budget B, individual attention constraint κi, overall attention constraint K.
Output: Seed set S.
1: Call Algorithm 1 as a subroutine to find an initial seed set S.
2: for Si ∈ S do
3: if Vi(Si) =Bi then
4: assume u is the last seed that has been added to Si by Algorithm 1
5: if Ui(Si\{u})≥Ui(Si) then
6: Si = Si\{u}
7: return S.
Lemma 2. V (·) is a monotone submodular function.
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Proof: It is easy to prove that V (·) is a monotone function. We next prove the submodu-
larity of V (·). The main idea is to first prove that Vi(·) is a submodular function, then the
lemma follows from the fact that the sum of positive submodular functions is submodular.
Given two sets of seeds X and Y such that X ⊆ Y , and consider the quantity
Vi(X ∪{v})−Vi(X) =min{αi · σi(X ∪{v}),Bi}−min{αi · σi(X),Bi}
Vi(Y ∪{v})−Vi(Y ) =min{αi · σi(Y ∪{v}),Bi}−min{αi · σi(Y ),Bi}
For ease of notation, let ∆X = Vi(X ∪{v})−Vi(X) and ∆Y = Vi(Y ∪{v})−Vi(Y ).
• Case 1: αi · σi(X ∪{v})≥Bi and αi · σi(X)≥Bi. This case is trivial ∆X =∆Y =0.
• Case 2: αi · σi(X ∪ {v})≥Bi and αi · σi(X)<Bi. It follows that ∆X =Bi−αi · σi(X)
and ∆Y =Bi−min{αi · σi(Y ),Bi} ≤Bi−αi · σi(X) =∆X .
• Case 3: αi · σi(X ∪{v})<Bi and αi · σi(X)<Bi
—Case 3.1: αi ·σi(Y ∪{v})<Bi and αi ·σi(Y )<Bi. We have ∆X = αi ·σi(X ∪{v})−
αi ·σi(X) and ∆Y = αi ·σi(Y ∪{v})−αi ·σi(Y ). Based on the fact that σi(·) is a submodular
function (Kempe et al. 2003), we have ∆X ≥∆Y .
—Case 3.2: αi ·σi(Y ∪{v})≥Bi and αi ·σi(Y )<Bi. We have ∆X = αi ·σi(X ∪{v})−
αi · σi(X) and ∆Y =Bi− αi · σi(Y )≤ αi · σi(Y ∪ {v})− αi · σi(Y ). Based on the fact that
σi(·) is a submodular function, we have ∆X ≥ αi · σi(Y ∪{v})−αi · σi(Y )≥∆Y .
—Case 3.3: αi ·σi(Y ∪{v})≥Bi and αi ·σi(Y )≥Bi. We have ∆X = αi ·σi(X ∪{v})−
αi · σi(X) and ∆Y =Bi−Bi = 0. Therefore, ∆X ≥∆Y .
Therefore ∆X ≥∆Y . 
Lemma 3. Given a finite ground set X = {Xij : 0≤ i≤ |A|; 0≤ j ≤ |V|}, and the inde-
pendent sets I are defined as
I = {T ⊆X :C1 and C2 are satisfied when Xij = 1 (resp. Xij = 0) for each Xij ∈ T (resp. Xij /∈ T )}
then (X ,I) is a matroid.
Proof: It is easy to prove that property (I1) is satisfied, i.e., if A ∈ I and B ⊆ A, then
B ∈ I. We next prove that (I2) also holds. Let X∗j = {X1j,X2j, · · · ,X|V|j}. If A,B ∈ I
and |B|> |A|, there must exist j such that |X∗j ∩B|> |X∗j ∩A|, together with fact that
|A| < |B| ≤K, and this means that adding any seed in X∗j ∩ (B\A) to A will maintain
independence, i.e., both C1 and C2 still hold. 
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Lemma 4. Algorithm 1 provides a 1/2-factor approximation for RMP.
Proof: According to (Fisher et al. 1978), the greedy algorithm achieves 1/2-factor approx-
imation for submodular maximization subject to one matroid constraint, then this lemma
follows immediately from Lemma 2 and Lemma 3. 
Theorem 3. Assume for each ai ∈ A, the minimum number of seeds needed to reach
budget Bi is at least 2, Algorithm 2 provides a 1/4-factor approximation for P.1.
Proof: Let SAlg1 = {S
Alg1
1 , S
Alg1
2 , · · · , S
Alg1
|A| } denote the seed set returned from Algorithm 1,
Lemma 4 indicates that V (SAlg1)≥ V (ŜR). Notice that in Algorithm 2, we remove the last
added seed u from S
Alg1
i if and only if Vi(S
Alg1
i ) =Bi, and Ui(S
Alg1
i \{u})≥ Ui(S
Alg1
i ). We
next prove that the total loss caused by removing all those seeds can be bounded.
Since the minimum number of seeds needed to reach budget Bi is at least 2 for any ad
ai, we have |S
Alg1
i | ≥ 2. Then based on the submodularity of Vi(·) and the greedy manner
of Algorithm 1, we have
Vi(S
Alg1
i \{u})≥ Vi(S
Alg1
i )−Vi(S
Alg1
i \{u})
⇒ Vi(S
Alg1
i \{u})≥
Vi(S
Alg1
i )
2
It follows that
Vi(S
Alg1
i \{u}) =Ui(S
Alg1
i \{u})≥
Vi(S
Alg1
i )
2
Let SAlg2 = {S
Alg2
1 , S
Alg2
2 , · · · , S
Alg2
|A| } denote the seed set returned from Algorithm 2, together
with Lemma 4, we have
U(SAlg2) =
|A|∑
i=1
Ui(S
Alg2
i ) =
∑
i∈H
Ui(S
Alg1
i \{u})+
∑
i∈SAlg2\H
Ui(S
Alg1
i ) (2)
≥
∑
i∈H
Vi(S
Alg1
i )
2
+
∑
i∈SAlg2\H
Vi(S
Alg1
i ) (3)
≥
V (SAlg2)
2
≥
V (ŜR)
4
(4)
Based on Lemma 1, we have
U(SAlg2)≥
V (ŜR)
4
≥
U(ŜP.1)
4
This finishes the proof of this theorem. 
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5. Unconstrained Social Advertising
In this section, we study the unconstrained social advertising problem. Notice that the
original objective function U(S)−C(S) may take negative value, this may cause trouble
for applying the concept of multiplicative approximation guarantee. To this end, instead of
directly maximizing the original objective function, we equivalently maximize the following
shifted objective function
f(S) =U(S)−C(S)+φ
where φ is some constant to ensure f(S)≥ 0 for any S. In practise, we may choose φ as the
maximum cost that can be incurred when allocating each ad to all users. In the rest of this
section, we use C+(S) to denote (C(S)+φ) for ease of notation. Similar to the approach
Algorithm 3 Randomized-U-RMP (subroutine)
Input: Social network G, individual attention constraint κi, overall attention constraint K.
Output: Ad allocation S.
1: for St ∈S do
2: Ot = ∅; Qt = V ;
3: for vj ∈V do
4: ai ← f ′(Ot ∪{vj})− f(Ot);
5: bi ← f
′(Qt\{vj})− f(Qt);
6: a′i =max{0, ai}; b
′
i =max{0, bi};
7: with probability a′i/(a
′
i+ b
′
i) do
8: Ot ←Ot ∪{vj}
9: else
10: Qt ←Qt\{vj}
11: return S = {O1,O2, · · · ,O|A|}
used in the previous section, we first introduce the unconstrained revenue maximization
problem (U-RMP) with the following objective function:
U-RMP: Maximize f ′(S) = V (S)−C+(S)
Let ŜP.2 (resp. ŜU ) denote the optimal solution of problem P.2 (resp. U-RMP), i.e.,
ŜP.2 =argmaxSf(S), Ŝ
R = argmaxSf
′(S)
Similar to Lemma 1, we first prove that
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Algorithm 4 Greedy-P.2
Input: Social network G, individual attention constraint κi, overall attention constraint K.
Output: Seed set S.
1: call Algorithm 3 as a subroutine to find an initial seed set S.
2: for Si ∈ S do
3: if Vi(Si) =Bi then
4: sort users in Si according to their marginal gains in terms of Vi(·) (same as in Algorithm 2)
5: assume u has the smallest marginal gain
6: if Ui(Si\{u})≥Ui(Si) then
7: Si = Si\{u}
8: return S.
Lemma 5.
f ′(ŜR)≥ f(ŜP.2)
The proof of Lemma 5 is similar to Lemma 1 thus omitted here.
Lemma 6. The function f ′(S) is submodular.
Proof: To prove this lemma, it suffices to show that V (S) is submodular and C+(S) is
supermodular. The first part immediately follows from Lemma 2.
Now we focus on proving that C+(S) is supermodular. We expand C+(S) as follows
C+(S) = λ1 ·
|V|∑
i=1
exp(max{0,
|A|∑
j=1
Xij −κi})︸ ︷︷ ︸
PartI
+λ2 · exp(max{0,
|V|∑
i=1
|A|∑
j=1
Xij −K})︸ ︷︷ ︸
PartII
+φ
It is easy to verify that both Part I and Part II are supermodular. Since nonnegative linear
combination of supermodular functions is supermodular, then together with the fact that
φ is a constant, we can prove that C+(S) is supermodular.
This finishes the proof of this lemma. 
Now we are ready to present a linear-time 1/2-approximation algorithm for U-RMP,
which is adapted from (Buchbinder et al. 2012). The detailed description can be found in
Algorithm 3. The algorithm maintains two candidate sets Ot and Qt for each St. Initially,
we set Ot = ∅; Qt = V. In each iteration we either adds vi to Ot or removes it from Qt. The
decision is made randomly with probability derived from the marginal gain of each of the
two options, i.e., a′i and b
′
i. The algorithm terminates when Ot and Qt are equal.
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Lemma 7. Algorithm 3 provides a 1/2-factor approximation for U-RMP.
Proof: According to Theorem I.2 in (Buchbinder et al. 2012), the greedy algorithm achieves
1/2-factor approximation for unconstrained submodular maximization, then this lemma
follows immediately from Lemma 6. 
Theorem 4. Assume for each ai ∈ A, the minimum number of seeds needed to reach
budget Bi is at least 2, Algorithm 4 provides a 1/4-factor approximation for P.2.
Proof: Similar to Theorem 3, we prove that the total loss can be bounded after removing
some users from Algorithm 3. Assume u has been removed from Si in Algorithm 4, based
on the submodularity of Vi(·) and the fact that u has the smallest marginal gain, we have
Vi(S
Alg3
i \{u})≥ Vi(S
Alg3
i )−Vi(S
Alg3
i \{u})
⇒ Vi(S
Alg3
i \{u})≥
Vi(S
Alg3
i )
2
It follows that
Vi(S
Alg3
i \{u}) =Ui(S
Alg3
i \{u}) =Ui(S
Alg4
i )≥
Vi(S
Alg3
i )
2
On the other hand, removing any user can only decrease the cost C+(S). Then we have
f(SAlg4) =U(SAlg4)+C+(SAlg4)≥
V (SAlg3)
2
+C+(SAlg3)≥
f ′(SAlg3)
2
≥
f ′(ŜR)
4
Then based on Lemma 5, we have
f(SAlg4)≥
f(ŜP.2)
4

6. Conclusion
In this paper, we propose and study two social advertising problems: budgeted social adver-
tising problem and unconstrained social advertising problem. We first prove that both
problems are NP-hard by reducing them from traditional influence maximization problem,
then develop two constant factor approximation algorithms for each problem.
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